中文摘要：

本文利用联立方程模型研究外部治理环境对我国上市公司债权人治理效率的影响,并深入分析了我国商业银行系统风险提高和上市公司代理问题激化的原因。本文的实证结果表明,政府干预是导致我国债权人治理低效的重要原因,而债权人治理低效激化了公司的过度投资和利益输送问题。随着政府干预的降低,商业银行对上市公司（特别是国有上市公司）长期债务的治理效率有所提高,债权人风险得到控制。但是,仍有部分上市公司利用债权人治理的漏洞,转而利用短期债务进行过度投资和利益输送,这为债权人治理提出了新的挑战。

英文摘要：

Using a simultaneous equations model,this article analyzes the impact of external governance environment on creditor governance efficiency which provides further discussion of the reason for the systematic risk in banking markets and the agency problems of listed companies.There is overinvestment and expropriation behavior in Chinese listed companies which is induced by low creditor governance efficiency under government intervention.In the region with low government intervention,the creditor governance mechanism become more efficient in long term debt which is especially prominent in SOEs,but some listed companies makes use of short term debt to pursue overinvestment and expropriation in turn which poses a new challenge to creditor governance.