中文摘要：

一般来说，量钥匙分发(QKD ) 由于量无常原则，量 noncloning 定理和意味着量不能进一步被划分的量 nondividing 原则为完美的设备被证明无条件地安全。然而，在系统使用的实际光、电的设备是有瑕疵的，它能被偷听者部分利用到或完全侦察在合法聚会之间的秘密钥匙。在这篇文章，我们简短首先在量关于国际性地执行的有瑕疵的设备砍在一些试验性的 QKD 系统上上考察最近的工作，然后，我们将在细节介绍我们的最近的砍工作包括被动法拉第镜子攻击，部分随机的阶段攻击，选择波长的 photon-number-splitting 攻击，频率移动攻击，和 single-photon-detector 攻击。那些量攻击提醒人改进安全由简单地增加反措施或采用象测量设备独立人士协议那样的一个完全不同的协议避免量砍在测量设备的瑕疵上由于有瑕疵的设备在实际 QKD 系统存在[Lo，等， Phys。加快。Lett， 2012， 108：130503 ] 。

英文摘要：

In general, quantum key distribution （QKD） has been proved unconditionally secure for perfect devices due to quantum uncertainty principle, quantum noneloning theorem and quantum nondividing principle which means that a quantum cannot be divided further. However, the practical optical and electrical devices used in the system are imperfect, which can be exploited by the eavesdropper to partially or totally spy the secret key between the legitimate parties. In this article, we first briefly review the recent work on quantum hacking on some experimental QKD systems with respect to imperfect devices carried out internationally, then we will present our recent hacking works in details, including passive faraday mirror attack, partially random phase attack, wavelength-selected photon-number-splitting attack, frequency shift attack, and single-photon-detector attack. Those quantum attack reminds people to improve the security existed in practical QKD systems due to imperfect devices by simply adding countermeasure or adopting a totally different protocol such as measurement-device independent protocol to avoid quantum hacking on the imperfection of measurement devices [Lo, et al., Phys. Rev. Lett., 2012, 108： 130503].