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中文摘要：
与已有围绕腐败对经济增长、财富分配、社会稳定等宏观效应的研究不同,文章将宏观制度环境与微观企业决策有机结合起来,重点考察官员腐败对企业代理成本的影响效应和传导机理。基于中国A股上市公司2000-2012年面板数据的实证研究表明,官员腐败显著提升了企业代理成本。具体表现为,随着企业所在地区官员腐败程度的上升,企业费用率显著增加,资产利用率则显著降低。研究还发现,相对于国有企业,官员腐败对非国有企业代理成本的影响效应更明显;同时,市场化改革也有利于缓解官员腐败对企业代理成本的影响强度。
英文摘要：
Different with the research of macroscopic effect related to economic growth, the distribution of wealth and social stability, this paper combines the system of macro environment and micro enterprise decision- making, and focuses on the influence of official corruption on enterprise agency costs and the conduction mechanism. Based on China＇ s A-share listed companies＇ annual data from 2000 to 2012, this paper empirically tests the influence of official corruption on enterprise agency costs. We find that official corruption significantly increases the agency costs of the enterprise. Specifically, the higher the degree of official corruption in the location of the company, the higher the enterprise fee ratio is. And enterprise asset utilization ratio is negatively correlated with official corruption. We also find that the influence of official corruption on the private enterprise agency costs is more significant compared with the state-owned enterprises, and the market-oriented reform effectively cushions the influence of official corruption on enterprise agency costs.
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