中文摘要：

在中国企业高管职务犯罪频发的背景下,文章运用经济学中的委托代理理论和寻租理论把高管侵占型职务犯罪视为高管的一种道德风险和权力寻租行为,高管出于机会主义动机采取“隐藏信息”、“隐藏行为”和“权力寻租”的方式攫取个人私利,从而降低了企业价值。同时,文章进一步从市场反应、长期价值表现和财务困境三个层面具体分析了高管侵占型职务犯罪对企业价值的短期影响、长期影响和极端影响。研究认为,高管侵占型职务犯罪会引发严重的不利市场反应,降低企业长期价值,导致企业陷入财务困境。

英文摘要：

In the context of frequent occurrence of embezzlement crimes committed by senior ex- ecutives in China＇s enterprises, this paper applies the principal agent theory and the rent-seeking theo- ry in the economics to view the embezzlement crimes committed by senior executives as a moral hazard and power rent-seeking behavior. Out of opportunist motivation, senior executives may grab in- dividual interests through such methods as hiding information, hiding behavior and power rent-seeking, thereby reducing the corporate value. Meanwhile, this paper makes a further analysis of the short-term, long-term and extreme influences of the embezzlement crimes committed by senior executives upon corporate value from the three levels of market response, long-term value expression and financial dis- tress. This study believes that the embezzlement crimes committed by senior executives would lead to serious adverse market reactions, which would reduce the long-term corporate value and make the corporate fall into financial distress.