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闭环供应链上的回收激励契约设计与政府补贴再制造政策的优化
  • ISSN号:1003-207X
  • 期刊名称:《中国管理科学》
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:TP273[自动化与计算机技术—控制科学与工程;自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]
  • 作者机构:湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙410079
  • 相关基金:国家自然科学基金国际合作资助项目(71420107027)
中文摘要:

废旧工业产品的回收再制造活动具有较大的正向外部经济特性,常常导致企业从事该项活动的动力不足。从节约资源和保护环境的目的出发,各国政府大都制定了给予补贴以鼓励回收再制造活动的政策。而且新产品和再制造产品一般具有一定的感知价值差异,可能会影响到再制造成本优势的发挥。将政府也作为一个决策主体,建立了以政府为领导者、制造商和再制造商、回收商为跟随者的三级非线性闭环供应链上的Stackelberg主从博弈模型,其中嵌套了基于委托代理关系分析基本技术框架的再制造商对回收商回收努力的最优激励契约。分析求解了政府和制造商、再制造商等的最优决策。政府的补贴政策将有效提高再制造品的竞争优势,同时有效降低废旧产品的掩埋等处理成本,有利于生态环境的保护。政府最优补贴下再制造商对回收商的最优激励机制设计可以有效提高废旧工业品的回收再制造效率。新产品和再制造产品的相互替代程度将间接影响到政府的最优补贴决策。同时通过数值分析得到再制造的比较成本优势对闭环供应链决策的影响。可供政府有关部门在政策制定以及闭环供应链上的企业决策时参考。

英文摘要:

Recycling and remanufacturing of wasted electrical and electronic products has positive external economic characteristics,often leading to insufficient motivation for enterprises.For the purpose of saving resources and protecting the environment,government provides subsidies to re-manufacturers to encourage them to recycle and remanufacture.New products and remanufactured products generally have certain differences in perceived value,and may further affect the manufacturing cost advantages play.The government is described as a decision-maker and a Stackelberg Game,in which the government acted as a leader,manufacturer and re-manufacturer are followers,recycler is the re-manufacturer's follower,is established.An optimal incentive contract between the re-manufacturer and recycler is nested based on the Principal-agent analysis.The optimal decision of the government and manufacturers,re-manufacturers is obtained.Optimal government subsidies will effectively improve the competitive advantage of remanufactured products and promot the development of remanufacturing industry,while effectively reduce the cost of burying the waste products.The optimal incentive mechanism design can effectively improve the efficiency of recycling and remanufacturing of waste.It is found that the degree of substitution of new products and remanufactured products indirectly influence government decisions and the government should adjust the subsidy according to the proportion of remanufacturing.The impact of remanufactured comparative cost advantage on closed-loop supply chain decisions is gotten by numerical analysis.The results can be used as reference for government policy formulation and company decision making.

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期刊信息
  • 《中国管理科学》
  • 中国科技核心期刊
  • 主管单位:中国科学院
  • 主办单位:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会 中科院科技政策与管理科学研究所
  • 主编:蔡晨
  • 地址:北京海淀区中关村北一条15号(北京8712信箱)
  • 邮编:100190
  • 邮箱:zgglkx@casipm.ac.cn
  • 电话:010-62542629
  • 国际标准刊号:ISSN:1003-207X
  • 国内统一刊号:ISSN:11-2835/G3
  • 邮发代号:82-50
  • 获奖情况:
  • 国内外数据库收录:
  • 日本日本科学技术振兴机构数据库,中国中国人文社科核心期刊,中国中国科技核心期刊,中国北大核心期刊(2008版),中国北大核心期刊(2011版),中国北大核心期刊(2014版)
  • 被引量:25352