中文摘要：

近年来，中国金融行业高管的天价薪酬引发舆论热议，国内外学者开始探究银行高管薪酬设计的合理性。鉴于学界和业界对银行业高管薪酬科学性的质疑，本文基于中国沪深上市银行2009-2012年的相关数据，探究银行业高管天价薪酬以及高管一员工薪酬差距的成因，并考察其对银行风险的影响。具体来说，本文首先研究了银行高管权力对高管薪酬的影响，在此基础上，探究了银行公司治理水平对高管权力与高管薪酬关系的调节效应。同时，还研究了银行高管薪酬及高管一员工薪酬差距对银行风险的影响。研究发现，在中国上市银行中，高管权力显著促进了高管薪酬水平的提升，而银行治理水平能够负向调节高管权力与高管薪酬的正相关关系，同时银行内部薪酬差距可以诱发银行风险。研究结论表明，中国银行业应当适度削弱高管权力，努力提高银行治理水平，以此确保高管薪酬设计的科学合理性，同时适当缩小高管一员工薪酬差距，以防范薪酬异常差距导致的银行风险。

英文摘要：

In recent years, the sky-high compensation of executives in financial industry has aroused heated discussion from the public and scholars at home and abroad has begun to test the reasonability of compensation design of bank executives. Considering the universal skepticism for bank executive compensation, this paper focuses on the reasons for the formation of sky-high compensation of bank executives and compensation gap between executives and employees, as well as their influences on bank risks. Specifically speaking, this paper firstly studies the influence of managerial power on executive compensation in banking. Then it explores the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between managerial power and executive compensation. Finally, it studies the influences of bank executive compensation and compensation gap between executives and employees on bank risks. It concludes that, there is a positive relationship between managerial power and executive compensation in Chinese listed banks, corporate governance of the banks will negatively moderate the positive correlation between managerial power and executive compensation, and compensation gap in internal banks can induce bank risks. These conclusions suggest that the banks should moderately restrain the managerial power and make efforts to improve corporate governance level of banks to ensure the reasonability of executive compensation design, and should reduce the compensation gap reasonably between executives and employees to prevent bank risks caused by the abnormal compensation gap.