中文摘要：

针对业主利用承包商之间竞争对其收益的影响，设置锦标赛和信用评价竞赛机制来激励承包商行为的问题，建立相应的委托代理模型，分析内、外部承包商能力相同和不相同时两种竞赛机制对承包商行为决策和业主收益的影响。研究表明：能力不相同时，承包商的创新努力投入随亲缘利他偏好和信用评价奖惩程度的增大而增大。在其他参数一定时，仅当信用评价奖惩系数满足一定条件，锦标赛机制才对承包商的技术创新行为具有激励作用；能力相同时，随机干扰、技术溢出水平越小，信用评价奖惩程度、锦标激励约束奖金越大，承包商的创新努力投入越大。相较外部承包商，亲缘内部承包商的创新努力投入更高；存在最优锦标激励约束奖金，其与其他参数大小有关。

英文摘要：

Considering the impact of competition between the contractors on their earnings, this paper establishes principal-agent model to analyze the problem that the owner sets up the tournament and the credit evaluation competition mechanism to motivate the cooperative innovation behavior of the contractors. It analyzes how the competition mechanisms effect on the contractors＇ behavioral decision and owner＇s revenue, when internal and external contractors have the same ability or not. It found that, under the different ability condition, the innovation effort investment of the contractors increases with the increasing of kin altruism preference and reward or punishment degree of credit evaluation. When the other parameters are invariant, and the reward or punishment coefficient of credit evaluation satisfies some conditions, tournament mechanism can motivate the technological innovation behavior of the contractors. Under the same ability condition, the smaller the random disturbance and the technology spillovers, the greater the reward or punishment degree of credit evaluation and the incentive or constraint bonus of tournament, the greater the innovation effort investment of the contractors. Compared with external contractors, kin internal contractors put into higher innovation effort. There is the optimal incentive or constraint bonus of tournament, which is related to the size of other parameters.