知识产权竞争加剧容易滋生专利蟑螂。在专利拥有量急剧增长、专利保护日益增强的中国是否存在专利蟑螂值得关注。本文对中国可能已经存在的本土专利蟑螂的盈利机制、诉讼模式与行为特征展开分析,从理论层面阐明此类诉讼模式集中表现为发起多次诉讼,且每次索要较低赔偿以累积诉讼收益,进而基于2000--2014年中国专利民事一审诉讼案件数据进行实证检验。研究表明,中国可能存在的本土专利蟑螂所发起的诉讼主要集中在传统制造行业,具有多次发起、低赔偿额、低诉讼摩擦性、高胜诉比率等基本特征。上述结论与美国的经验证据存在鲜明反差,这与中国被诉主体专利意识薄弱、产业成熟度不足以及国家专利侵权惩罚力度较低紧密相关。本文认为,专利蟑螂的中国衍生模式客观上有利于打击专利侵权行为,但多次发起的“小”专利诉讼降低了国家专利制度和司法保护的运行效率。对此,本文提出,在辨明本土专利蟑螂诉讼模式和作用的基础上,应该高度警惕本土专利蟑螂对专利制度可能造成的损害,在专利维权和司法资源过度使用之间寻找有效平衡,构建更趋全面、高效的知识产权保护体系。
Fierce competition among economic players in intellectual property provides the opportunity for the patent troll who lives with patent litigation. Whether patent troll exists in China and its litigation model deserves attention, especially when the number fo patent in China is dramatically increasing and China is now strengthening the patent protection. This paper theoretically predicts the litigation model of the derivative patent troll in China, arguing that the patent troll in China will issue series of litigation and ask for low compensation each time, so as to accumulate revenue. We further empirically test the prediction via the patent litigation data during 2004--2014. Research shows that the lawsuits issued by the patent troll are concentrated in traditional manufacturing industries with the feature of repeated litigation, low compensation, low friction and high winning rate. These conclusions are largely different from that of United States, which could be explained by weak patent awareness of defendant, industry immaturity and low infringement award. This paper argues that the lawsuits issued by patent troll could help fight against patent infringement. However, the repeatedly launched "small" patent litigations would reduce the efficiency of litigation system and increase the risk of litigation abuse. Therefore, the balance between patent protection and the abuse of litigation should be reached, in order to establish an efficient patent system.