随着零售市场竞争的日益激烈,越来越多的零售商采用自有产品营销战略。在零售商处于主导地位的供应链中,本文首先假设消费者对品牌产品的估值服从均匀分布,分别在一体化、分散式和协调式供应链系统下给出了零售商引入自有产品的条件,分析了其对双方决策和利润的影响。随后,本文假设消费者对品牌产品的估值服从正态分布,通过算例分析了引入自有产品对双方决策和利润的影响。研究表明,零售商提供自有产品作为一种策略,迫使制造商降低品牌产品的批发价格,削弱因双方独立决策而导致的”双重边际效应”,使得他在分散式供应链和协调式供应链中都能获利,但对制造商总是不利。在正态分布的情形下,引入自有产品在分散式供应链中对制造商有利,但在协调式供应链系统中,对制造商不利。
As the competition of retail market is becoming increasingly intense, more and more retailers are using the strategy of introducing store-brand (SB) product. First, under a uniformly distributed valuation of national-brand (NB) product accepted by consumers and the retailer- leader Stackelberg game frame- work, the condition of introducing SB product is obtained in integrated/decentralized/coordinated chain, respectively. Then, the effect of introducing SB product on pricing policies and its related profits is ana- lyzed. Finally, the model is extended to a normal distribution through numerical examples. The result shows that the introduction of SB product can force the manufacturer to reduce NB product's wholesale price and weaken the negative effects of double marginalization caused by making decisions independently, and the retailer always benefits from introducing SB product not only in the decentralized supply chain but also in the coordinated supply chain. However, under a normal distribution, introducing SB product is ad- vantageous for the manufacturer in the decentralized supply chain, and it is adverse for the manufacturer in the coordinated supply chain.