中文摘要：

一个同质的多单位拍卖模型处于二个条件被学习：一个人是投标人面对预算限制，另外一个是投标人不面对预算限制。每个投标人的二平衡投标策略处于这二个条件被介绍。由比较他们，作者证明平衡单位价格面对限制将是的预算投标不到那当预算限制不在时。二个平衡出价之间的差别导致卖主的减少的收入。并且当投标人的数字增加，这差别将减少。

英文摘要：

A homogenous multi-unit auction model is studied in two conditions： One is that the bidders face budget constraints and another is that the bidders do not face budget constraints. Two equilibrium bidding strategies of each bidder are presented in these two conditions. By comparing them, the authors show that the equilibrium unit price bid in the presence of budget constraints will be less than that in the absence of budget constraints. The difference between the two equilibrium bids leads to the reduced revenue of the seller. And this difference will decrease as the number of the bidders increases.