中文摘要：

本文以2004～2011年中国A股上市公司为分析样本，从管理防御角度，考察了经营者管理防御的机会主义行为对公司现金持有价值的影响。研究结果表明，管理防御程度与现金持有价值负相关，其程度在国有企业强于民营企业。为了抑制管理防御行为对现金持有价值的不利影响，本文进一步从管理防御的激励约束机制视角，研究了经营者持股和大股东治理对公司现金持有价值的影响。通过分组回归分析，研究结果发现，经营者的高持股激励和大股东的高持股控制均能够有效减轻管理防御的代理问题，从而能够显著提高公司现金持有价值。本文的研究不仅丰富了管理防御及其激励约束机制与现金持有价值研究领域的内容。而且对相关监管部门也具有参考价值。

英文摘要：

Using the data of Chinese listed companies with A-share during 2004-2011, based on managerial entrenchment, this paper examines the impacts of opportunistic behaviors of managerial entrenchment on the value of cash holdings. It shows that there is a significant inverse correlation between the degree of the managerial entrenchment and the value of cash holdings, which is more sig- nificant in state-owned firms than in state-owned firms. In order to restrain the adverse effects of managerial entrenchment on the val- ue of cash holdings, we explores the effects of managers＇ shareholding and controlling shareholders governance on the value of cash holdings from the view of the incentives and restraints of managerial entrenchment. The results show that the more managers hold shares or the more large shareholders hold shares, the better they can alleviate managers＇ agency problems, which can increase the value of cash holding significantly. This paper not only contributes to the literature of managerial entrenchment and its system of in- centives and restraints and the value of cash holding, but also has reference value for the relevant regulatory authorities.