中文摘要：

论文通过实验对不完全信息条件下双主并方合作而目标企业善意配合的并购定价、并购持股、并购时机选择等并购策略进行了验证性研究。首先,基于现有理论成果和新兴的实验研究方法,提出了六条实验假设;其次,以单方善意并购情形为比较基准,分别对单方善意并购和双主并方合作善意并购情形下的角色扮演、实验变量、实验分组、实验流程、实验过程控制和支付函数进行了设置和界定,并通过实验参数的不同设置来刻画和区分不同的实验情形与实验分组;最后,通过计量统计研究发现,在不完全信息条件下,协同收益率、控制权溢价率与均衡的并购交易价格同向变化;协同收益率越高,谈判用时越短,控制权溢价率越高,谈判用时越长;信息越趋于完全,最佳并购时机越早到来;初始持股的＂门槛效应＂加速了最佳并购时机的到来;双主并方之间的合作联盟降低了并购成交价格;并购双方的合谋并不是导致并购市场资源配置效率降低的主导因素。

英文摘要：

Abstract： The paper tries to verify the merger strategy, including pricing strategy, shareholding strategy and timing strategy, in theories with two bidders＇ cooperation and one target＇ s goodwill under incomplete information, through experiment. Firstly, it puts forward six hypotheses based on the existing theoretical researches and emerging methods for validation study; Secondly, taking the situation with single bidder and single friendly target enterprise as the benchmark, it sets the experimental variables, grouping, experimental procedures, experimental process control and defines the payoff function, through setting different experimental parameters to characterize and distinguish different experiment situation and grouping, both covering the benchmark situation and the friendly merger with two bidders＇ cooperation; Finally, through the statistical measurement study, the results show that, under incomplete information, the collaborative yield, the control premium rate and the equilibrium price in M ＆A bargaining change in a cooperative direction ; the higher the collaborative yield is, the shorter time the negotiation takes, while it is otherwise for the control premium rate ; The more useful information exist, the sooner the M ＆A opportunities comes; The ＂threshold effect＂ of initial holdings accelerates the M＆A activity; The cooperation between two bidders reduces the equilibrium price in bargaining; The collusion between the two sides of M＆A is a factor that reduces the resource allocation efficiency of capital market, but not the leading one.