为获取竞争优势,企业在资源和能力有限的条件下需要对创新模式作出合理的选择。本文运用演化博弈理论,对企业在创新投入补贴和创新产品补贴条件下的创新模式选择进行了探讨,在此基础上分析和比较了两种创新补贴对创新模式选择的影响。结果表明:无论是创新投入补贴还是创新产品补贴,补贴标准的提高均会导致企业选择颠覆性创新模式的可能性增大,选择渐进性创新模式的可能性减小,反则反之;在不同产品价格与边际成本差额条件下,两种创新补贴对创新模式选择影响的显著性存在差异。
To gain competitive advantages, enterprises need to make a rational decision on innovation mode selection under the condition of limited resources and competence. With an evolutionary game theory, the innovation mode selection of enterprises under innovation input subsidy and subsidy for innovative products is discussed, based on that, the impacts of two innovation subsidles on innovation mode selection are analyzed and compared. The results show that regardless of innovation input subsidy or subsidy for innovative products, increasing standards of these two innovation subsidies will cause enterprises select radical innovation mode with the higher probability and select incremental innovation mode with the lower probability, otherwise the results are reverse; under the condition of difference between product price and marginal cost, there is a different caused by the impact significance of two innovation subsidies on innovation mode selection.