中文摘要：

观点可查找加密了关键词把一条漂亮途径介绍给没有解密的需要，检索加密数据。因为这个观点的介绍，有二种主要可查找的加密关键词技术，对称的可查找的加密(SSE ) 和有关键词的公钥加密搜索(PEKS ) 。由于复杂钥匙管理问题在 SSE，很多水泥 PEKS 构造被建议了到克服它。然而，这些 PEKS 计划的安全仅仅微弱地在外人攻击的存在被定义；因此，他们受不了作为一个内部的人从数据库服务器猜测攻击的关键词。怎么抵抗内部的人攻击遗体一个挑战性的问题。我们求婚第一可查找对内部的人攻击(SEK-IA ) 加密了关键词框架到地址这问题。在公钥环境下面的 SEK-IA 的安全模型被重建。我们给水泥 SEK-IA 建设与一扇经常尺寸的地板门展示了，建议计划正式被证明到对内部的人安全攻击。性能评估证明通讯在我们的 SEK-IA 在接收装置和服务器之间花费了计划遗体常数，独立于身份设置了的发送者尺寸，和接收装置需要最小化的计算费用产生一扇地板门从多重发送者寻找数据。

英文摘要：

The notion of searchable encrypted keywords introduced an elegant approach to retrieve encrypted data without the need of decryption. Since the introduction of this notion, there are two main searchable encrypted keywords techniques, symmetric searchable encryption （SSE） and public key encryption with keyword search （PEKS）. Due to the complicated key management problem in SSE, a number of concrete PEKS constructions have been proposed to overcome it. However, the security of these PEKS schemes was only weakly defined in presence of outsider attacks;therefore they suffer from keyword guessing attacks from the database server as an insider. How to resist insider attacks remains a challenging problem. We propose the first searchable encrypted keywords against insider attacks （SEK-IA） framework to address this problem. The security model of SEK-IA under public key environment is rebuilt. We give a concrete SEK-IA construction featured with a constant-size trapdoor and the proposed scheme is formally proved to be secure against insider attacks. The performance evaluations show that the communication cost between the receiver and the server in our SEK-IA scheme remains constant, independent of the sender identity set size, and the receiver needs the minimized computational cost to generate a trapdoor to search the data from multiple senders.