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中文摘要：
在双寡头企业产量竞争的基本模型基础上,考虑了政府规制水平的影响,分析了生产高、低质量安全水平的两个食品企业分别在古诺和斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型中的均衡质量水平及其相互关系,结果揭示了不同模型中两个企业的最优质量安全水平之间的关系及其均衡点。在斯塔克尔伯格模型中,以生产高质量安全水平产品的企业为产量领导者时,其产品质量安全水平、价格、产量和利润远高于追随企业;两个企业的均衡质量安全水平、价格和产量都随着政府相关部门规制水平的提高而上升。
英文摘要：
This paper considers the regulation level on the basis of the model of the quantity competition of duopoly enterprises,and analyzes the quality and safety level of equilibrium and their relationship by Cournot and Stackelberg games models between the enterprise with the product of the high quality and safety level and the enterprise with the product of the low quality and safety level.The results reveal the relationship of the optimal quality and safety levels and their equilibrium points.The leader＇s product quality and safety,price,quantity and profit are much higher than the follower＇s,and the quality and safety level of equilibrium,price and quantity would rise by the increase of regulation level in the Stackelberg model of the enterprise with the product of the high quality and safety level as the leader.
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