欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
经典的古诺博弈、斯坦克尔博格博弈和伯川德博弈在市场是完全信息化且产品同质性的情况下得出了各自的纳什均衡解。然而，现实经济社会中的寡头垄断市场难以满足产品同质性的假设。因此，通过放宽经典模型中的“产品同质化”这一假设，可从异质性产品市场的角度出发，比较分析三大博弈的纳什均衡结果，并探究在斯坦克尔博格博弈中，先动厂商的均衡利润相较于其他两个博弈的均衡利润是否存在比较优势。研究结果表明，由于产品的可替代性和互补性的不同，三大博弈的市场均衡结果之间存在显著区别。但斯坦克尔博格博弈的先动厂商无论在产品是可替代品或互补品的情况下，其均衡利润都大于古诺博弈及伯川德博弈的均衡结果。
英文摘要：
The classic Cournot game,Stackelberg game and Bertrand game indicate the Nash equilibrium solutions under the hypothesis of complete information and product homogeneity market.However,the reality about oligopoly market is hard to satisfy the above hypothesis.This paper broadens the hypothesis of product homogeneities in the classic models,and compares the Nash equilibrium solutions of the three games from the perspective of product heterogeneity.Further,this paper researches that if there is a comparative advantage for the leading firms’Equilibrium profit in the model of Stackelberg game,compared to the other two game equilibrium profits.The result shows that,the outcomes of market equilibrium are dramatically different in these three models,due to the difference between complementary and substitutable products.The equilibrium profit in Stackelberg game is higher than the ones in other two games,no matter whether the products are substitutes or complements.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
期刊信息
位置：