中文摘要：

经营权与控制权分离引发的代理问题是催生独立董事这一群体的制度根源。引入独立董事制度，维护公司整体利益，尤其是关注中小股东的合法权益不受损害，是监管机构改善公司治理结构的重要举措。独立董事在本质上也是剩余索取者的代理人，与股东之间同样存在代理问题。如何构建独立董事激励机制，使其与中小股东建立有效受托责任关系，是监管部门和实务界面临的一大难题。以2002年至2015年沪、深两市A股主板上市公司为样本，使用手工配对法、Logit回归和OLS回归，采用进一步分析和一系列稳健性检验，从个人特征、公司特征和制度环境3个层面考察零薪酬独立董事的影响因素，并从“追名”和“逐利”两个角度对独立董事履职动机进行探讨。研究结果表明，从个人特征看，零薪酬更可能出现在独立性较强的董事中；从公司特征看，零薪酬更可能出现在违规风险较低的公司；从制度环境看，零薪酬更可能出现在市场化程度较高的地区。零薪酬独立董事在出席董事会时也更加勤勉，以上结论与“追名”动机逻辑一致。进一步研究发现，会计背景的零薪酬独立董事能进一步甄别出财务风险更高的公司；由于存在自选择，零薪酬独立董事任职公司的治理水平更高，其并未出具更多的否定意见。研究结果说明经济和声誉两种激励方式在不同独立董事个体间发挥的作用差异较大。一方面，为独立董事零薪酬现象提供了合理解释，说明上市公司应当根据自身所处的制度环境、风险水平以及每位独立董事的具体特征等设定差异化的薪酬水平；另一方面，也对监管部门完善独立董事激励机制、培育独立董事人才市场具有现实的指导意义。

英文摘要：

The agency problem caused by the separation of management and ownership is the institutional source that leads to the birth of independent directors. Introducing the independent director system and protecting the whole corporate benefits, especially preventing legitimate rights and interests of minority shareholders from damage, is important for regulators to improve corporate governance. Because independent directors are the agent of the residual claimants in nature, the agency problem also exists between them and shareholders. For that reason, it is a challenge for regulators and practitioners to construct a rational incentive mechanism for independent directors and to establish effective fiduciary duties between directors and minority shareholders. In this paper, we select the A-share listed firms from 2002 to 2015 as our samples and use manual matching method, Logit regression and OLS regression as our main research methods. Meanwhile, we also conduct further analysis and a series of tests for robustness. In general, this paper examines the influences which cause independent directors to accept zero remuneration from the levels of personal characteristics, firm characteristics and institutional environment. Furthermore, the paper discusses the resumption incentives of independent directors from the perspectives of ＂fame＂ and ＂fortune＂. Based on our results, when we examine their personal characteristics, we find that the more independent an independent director is, the more likely he will accept zero remuneration. As for firm characteristics, the results show that the zero remuneration independent director （ZRID） is more likely to resume in firms with lower violation risks. In addition, as for institutional environment, zero remuneration is more likely to occur within higher marketization levels. Then, in consistence with the logic of fame incentives, ZRID is also more diligent when he attends board meetings. Further research finds that the ZRID with accounting background can further identify fi