中文摘要：

在位航空公司利用航空频率经济性构建轮辐型网络结构和歧视定价，导致经典的可竞争市场理论在放松管制后的航空市场中失灵。模型表明，当频率经济性强度系数较小时（0〈f〈0．305），在位者和新进入航空公司在三个市场都能共存；当频率经济性强度系数适中时（0．305≤f〈0．507），新进入航空公司将被迫退出其中一个市场；当频率经济性强度系数较大时（0．507≤f〈1），新进入航空公司将被迫退出所有市场。

英文摘要：

The incumbent airline built Hub-Spoke network based on the economy of frequency and made the discriminate pricing, this led the failure of classic theory of contestable market in the airline business after the slack control. The analysis showed three results： when the index of economies of frequency was big, the incumbent airline and new entrant could be existing in three markets; however, when the index of economies be compelled to quit out of one of them; what＇s was small, the new entrant would be compelled of frequency was general, the new entrant would more, when the index of economies of frequency to quit out of all the markets.