中文摘要：

基于2009—2011年沪深A股上市公司数据，考察政府干预对上市公司股利政策的影响。研究结果发现：政府对上市公司的干预程度越高，公司向股东发放股利的可能性越小，股利支付率越低；进一步研究还发现，在市场资源和技术资源较丰富的公司中，政府干预程度将减弱，公司更可能向股东发放较高程度的股利。这一结论验证了政府干预影响公司股利决策的理论依据，从实践上为中国上市公司制定合理的股利支付提供决策。

英文摘要：

Based on the data of A-share market in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2011, this paper mainly examines the effects of government intervention on firms＇ dividend policy. The results show that the higher the degree of government intervention, the less the probability that the board implements dividend policy, and the lower the rate of cash dividend pay to shareholders. It is also found that the degree of government intervention is reduced in compa- nies which have more marketing and technological resources, and accordingly, there is higher probability of dividend policy being implemented and more cash dividend pay for shareholders in these companies. These findings have verified the theoreti- cal basis of the effect of government intervention on the firm＇s dividend policy, and have positive implications for relevant poli- cies in practice.