中文摘要：

现行耕地保护政策是一种“委托-代理”式的体制,其核心是指标管理加上监督惩罚,忽视了调动地方政府保护保耕地的积极性,导致中央和地方在耕地保护上的激励不相容.从土地财政、廉价土地出让和违法超额占地等3个方面评估了我国耕地保护的数量;从粮食盈余、财政支农、可持续发展3个方面估算了耕地保护的质量.通过对各省耕地数量保护和耕地质量保护的测算,划分出耕地保护赤字区、平衡区和盈余区.根据分析的结论,补充并完善了耕地保护补偿的“纵横模式”,促进耕地保护外部性内部化,公平分担耕地保护的成本,具有理论和实践的可行性.

英文摘要：

The current policy of China farmland protection is a kind of principal-agent system. It mainly relies on land quota and severe punishment. But this policy ignores the local governments＇ motivation of farmland protection, which results in incentive incompatibility between central and local government. This thesis estimates the farmland protection quantity in and quality, the former is affected by land finance, illegal farmland use; the latter by grain surplus, financial expenditure and sustainable development of agrieuhure. Based on the estimates above, we divided farmland protection into deficit area, balance area and surplus area. According to the conclusion, a compensation model for China farmland protection named ＂Longitudinal and Horizontal＂ should be used to rectify the unfairness to internalize the externalities, to enhance the inefficiency of farmland protection, which has theoretical and practical feasibility.