中文摘要：

本文以中国A股市场2010—2012年117家新能源概念类上市公司为研究样本，分别基于上市公司、投资者以及公司高管三个视角，实证检验了谁才是政府财政补贴的真正“赢家”，旨在为厘清财政补贴的经济后果提供新的经验证据。研究发现，财政补贴对中国上市公司的经营业绩并不存在显著的正向影响，也无助于投资者获得更高的市场回报率，但财政补贴却帮助民营上市公司高管获得更多的薪酬，并显著降低国有上市公司高管的薪酬业绩敏感性。这一实证结果意味着，中国的财政补贴政策未必发挥了足够的效率，因为公司高管事实上成为财政补贴的真正“赢家”。鉴于此，本文从合理制定财政补贴政策、提高财政补贴资金使用效率、客观评价财政补贴对企业的影响以及科学制定高管薪酬与公司业绩评价体系等视角提出了政策建议。

英文摘要：

Using a sample of 117 Chinese A-share listed companies with the concept of new energy for the period of 2010--2012, this paper empirically tests who are the winners of fiscal subsidies, the listed companies, investors or executives, so as to provide new empirical evidence to clarify the economic consequences of fiscal subsidies. We find that Chinese listed companies getting more fiscal subsidies do not have the better operating performance or higher market returns. However, higher fiscal subsidies are associated with higher executive compensation in private listed companies and lower pay-performance sensitivities for executives in state-owned listed company. The results indicate that, China＇s fiscal subsidies to listed companies are somehow inefficient, because the major beneficiaries of fiscal subsidies are corporate executives. In view of this, this paper puts forward four policy suggestions, namely, improving regulations on the fiscal subsidy policies, increasing the use efficiency of fiscal subsidy, objectively evaluating the impacts of fiscal subsidy policies on firms and scientifically formulating appraisal system of executive compensation and firm＇s performance.