中文摘要：

本文在债务期限结构相关理论的指引下，揭示终极控制股东会基于代理冲突和财务风险的权衡确定一个合理的目标债务期限结构，并结合我国的制度环境，理论推演终极控制股东和政府干预如何影响企业的目标债务期限决策，并采用民营上市公司的面板数据，运用系统GMM模型检验终极控制股东现金流权和控制权偏离度（两权偏离度）、政府干预程度和企业目标债务期限水平的关系。具体来讲：（1）终极控制股东的两权偏离度和目标债务期限水平显著负相关；（2）政府干预与目标债务期限水平的正相关关系并不显著；（3）政府干预削弱了两权偏离度和目标债务期限水平之间的负相关关系。

英文摘要：

Under the guidance of related debt maturity theories, this paper reveals that ultimate controlling shareholders would determine a reasonable target debt maturity structure based on the trade-off between agency conflicts and financial risk. Combined with China＇s institutional environment, this paper theoretically deduces how ultimate controlling shareholders and government intervention affect target debt maturity structure decision-making. Using panel data of private listed companies, the system GMM model is applied to test the relationship among the separation of control from ownership （the wedge）, government intervention and target debt maturity level. Specifically, this study finds that： （1） The wedge is negatively correlated with target debt maturity level with significance; （2） Government intervention is positively correlated with target debt maturity level without significance; （3） Goverument intervention weakens the negative relationship between the wedge and target debt maturity.