本文依据中国公司治理指数(CCGI^NK)的研究表明,基于不同的治理战略,上市公司大股东对公司治理机制的作用迥异,对不同的公司治理机制存在显著的选择偏好。具体而言,第一大股东可能在一定程度上改善公司治理机制,利用公司治理的信号显示作用,在谋取私人利益的同时博取良好的市场声誉;同时,基于操控公司治理和管理的需要,第一大股东可能避重就轻,偏好于对上市公司信息披露、利益相关者治理产生更为显著的“正向作用”。与之相对,其他大股东持股比例和大股东制衡度(或联合制衡度)可能对上市公司治理整体产生“负向影响”,并且对上市公司信息披露、利益相关者治理的“负向影响”更为显著。
In this paper, on a basis of the Chinese Corporate Governance Index ( CCGI^NK) in 2003, the authors find that btockholders of listed companies have different impacts on and different choice preference to different Corporate governance mechanisms. Concretely, the controlling shareholders enhance corporate governance mechanisms to some extent based on different governance strategies in order to enlist private benefits and get " clear market reputation", but avoid the important and dwell on the trivial so that they prefer CCGI IDI^NK and CCGI^NK STH to CCGI SH^NK, CCGI BOD^NK, CCGI MI^NK and CCGI SC^NK in order to control corporate governance and management. On the contrary, shareholding percents of other blockholders and counterbalance degrees ( or combined counterbalance degrees) of blockholders are negatively associated with CCGI^NK and especially with CCGI IDI^NK and CCGI STH^NK more significantly than with CCGI SH^NK, CCGI BOD^NK , CCGI MI^NK and CCGI SC^NK.