中文摘要：

研究目的：模拟土地非农化过程中中央政府与地方政府以及地方政府之间的博弈关系。研究方法：斯坦克尔伯格模型和库诺特竞争模型。研究结果：土地税费政策监管不力和地方政府间的过度竞争是造成土地过度非农化的一个重要原因。研究结论：要协调好经济发展与土地资源保护间的关系必须从两方面着手：一是完善土地非农化过程中的税费政策，加强税费监管；二是引导地方政府改变经济发展模式，避免以牺牲土地资源为代价的恶性竞争。

英文摘要：

The purpose of this paper is to simulate two kinds of game-theory relationships between central and local governments, and among the local governments within the process of land conversion for non-agricultural use. Methods employed include Stackelberg Model and Cournot Model. The results indicate that the weak supervision of land tax policies and excessive competitions among local governments are the important causes of excessive land conversion for non-agricultural use. It is concluded that in order to coordinate the relationship between economic development and land resource preservation, two kinds of measures should be taken： （1）perfect the tax policies on land conversion for non-agricuhural use and enhance its supervision mechanism; （2）guide local governments to change the economic development pattern in order to avoid vicious completions at the cost of land resources.