中文摘要：

根据产品体验性引起的实体渠道与网络渠道的差异,建立了单一电子渠道、零售商与制造商独立竞争以及零售商加盟制造商这三种渠道结构,讨论基于产品体验性的供应链渠道运营组合及合作条件.结果表明,市场需求确定时,产品体验性影响供应链最优渠道结构并引发渠道冲突,合理地设计加盟合约的加盟费用可以协调渠道冲突,但当产品体验性小于一个阈值时,单一电子渠道仍然是最优渠道结构;市场需求不确定时,两阶段加盟合约可以在产品体验性较高时协调渠道矛盾、增加供应链利润,若体验性较低,虽然供应链整体利润减少,但两阶段加盟合约的预付款对于制造商来说具有时间价值,仍然有达成合约的可能性.

英文摘要：

Three channel structures, i.e., the e-store structure, the retailer competing with the manufacturer, and the manufacturer licensing the retailer, are established according to the differences of product experiences from e-stores and traditional stores. First, the manufacturer＇s retail channel structures is referred to as e-stores if the manufacturer uses his own channel as the only direct distribution method and a dual channel structure if the manufacturer uses retailers as a substitute for shopping at an e-store. Based on the dual channel structure, a royalty contract is considered as well. The results show that when the demand is certain, product experience influences the manufacturer＇s channel selection strategy and causes supply chain conflicts. An appropriately designed royalty contract can coordinate the supply chain, but e-stores dominate if product experience is high enough. When the demand is uncertain, if product experience is higher than a threshold, a two-part tariff contract can benefit total supply chain profit, otherwise a royalty contract is better but a royalty cap license with an up-front payment can serve as a source of financing.