中文摘要：

本文以2005～2014年我国A股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验了关联交易、管理层权力以及二者交互作用对公司违规的影响，并探索了审计监督作为外部公司治理机制在其中扮演的重要角色。研究发现：上市公司关联交易水平越高、管理层权力越大，越有可能发生公司违规；管理层权力加剧了关联交易与公司违规的正相关关系，这意味着权力膨胀的管理层可能利用关联交易从事机会主义行为；高质量审计师（主要是国内“四大”而非国际“四大”）可以发挥公司治理作用，显著降低了管理层利用关联交易从事机会主义行为所带来的公司违规风险。进一步地研究发现，随着关联交易资金流方向、公司违规类型的不同，关联交易、管理层权力以及高质量审计师对于公司违规的影响也有所差异。

英文摘要：

Using a sample of listed companies in Chinese A-share market for the period of 2005 to 2014, this paper empirically tests the influences of related party transactions （RPTs） , managerial power and their interaction on corporate fraud, and explores the role of audit supervision as an external corporate governance mechanism in that process. The results indicate the higher level of the listed companies＇ RPTs and the greater the managerial power, the greater the likelihood of fraud, the managerial power increases the positive correlation between RPTs and fraud, which means that top managers with greater power may use RPTs to engage in opportunistic behaviors, high quality auditors （ domestic rather than international ＂Big Four＂ accounting firms） play important roles in monitoring powerful top managers, thereby reducing the risk of fraud caused by the latter. Further studies find that the influences of RPTs, managerial power and the auditor on fraud vary with the RPTs＇ cash flow direction and the types of fraud.