中文摘要：

改革开放以来,用地审批制度逐步成为中国土地管理的重要制度和手段之一,土地审批制度也历经了多次改革。为分析土地审批制度变化对建设占用耕地的影响,本文梳理了中国土地审批制度的改革历程,选取1995-2013年省级面板数据进行实证分析。结果表明：审批建设占用耕地规模对建设占用耕地的影响具有滞后性,全国当年审批建设占用耕地面积每增加1hm~2能够显著引起当年及次年实际耕地被占用面积分别增加0.25hm2和0.36hm~2,即当年建设占用耕地1hm~2中约有0.25hm~2由当年审批用地所致、约有0.36hm~2为前一年审批用地所致、约0.4hm~2为其他年份审批以及违法占地等所导致;国务院审批土地比重的增加使得建设占用耕地面积显著减少,国务院审批面积比重每增加1%约能减少耕地占用面积2351hm~2;1999-2005年审批权限上收期比2006-2013年审批权限调整下放期在耕地保护的作用更为显著。建设用地审批权限的上收减缓了建设占用耕地速度,但后期的审批权限调整下放并未显著影响建设占用耕地。

英文摘要：

Since China＇s reform and opening up,the land examination and approval system has experienced several reforms as an important land management system in China. The relationship between land examination and approval system reform and cultivated land occupation by construction should be taken as a critical question and is worthy of further study. Here,we combine the evolution of land examination and approval system and selected provincial panel data from1995 to 2013 for empirical analysis. The results show that there is a time lag between approved farmland occupation and annual cultivated land occupation by construction. Each additional 1hm~2 of this year and last year approved farmland occupation has led to the actual cultivated land occupied area increasing by 0.25hm~2 and 0.36hm~2. In other words,when construction occupies 1hm~2 of cultivated land,40% of the land caused by the approved farmland occupation of other years,except the last two years,and illegal occupation. This result implies low land use efficiency after land examination and approval. When the proportion of land area under the approval of the State Council increases by 1%,cultivated land occupied areas increase by 2351hm~2. This statistical analysis indicates that cultivated land occupation has been significantly decreased by concentrating land examination and approval power. In addition,there is a more significant impact in land approval power centralization reform from 1999 to 2005 than 2006 to 2013,when the central government inclined to delegate land approval power to lower- level governments. Thus,land examination and approval system reform tends to slow down cultivated land occupation by approval power centralization. In contrast,the decentralization of land examination and approval power has little impact on the rate of cultivated land occupation by construction.