中文摘要：

利用手工搜集的创业板上市公司数据，本文对公司聘请退休政府官员任独立董事是否为企业带来了实际经济好处进行了考察。研究发现，政府官员背景独立董事主要发挥的是“政府关系”协调功能，该功能的发挥依赖于地区制度环境。控制公司高管政治关联的情况下，在制度环境较差的地区，聘请退休政府官员的企业确实得到了更多税收优惠、政府补助等政府控制性资源。进一步的分析表明，与中央政府官员背景的独立董事相比，地方政府官员背景的独立董事能为公司带来更大的经济利益；仍担任行业协会职务的政府官员背景独立董事比完全退休的政府官员背景独立董事也更能为企业谋利。研究证实了公众对退休政府官员担任独立董事的担忧和质疑，为改进独立董事选聘制度、严格官员治理及加快政府职能的转变提供了理论依据。

英文摘要：

Using manually collected data whether firms benefit from the appointment from China＇ s growth enterprise of retired government officials as markets, we examines independent directors. Independent directors with government official background do play the role of coordinating government relations, which depends on institutional environment. Controlling other political connections, they do bring firms such government controlled resources as tax preference and government subsidies in areas where the institutional environment is poor. Further researches show that compared with central government officials, independent directors with local government official background can bring firms more benefits; independent directors who still work for the industry association can help firms more than those who have entirely retired. The results certify the public＇ s worry and query, and lay theoretical foundation for regulating the appointment of independent directors and the behaviors of government officials, and speeding up the transformation of government functions.