中文摘要：

近年来，封建王朝周期性兴衰问题逐渐成为新制度经济学和历史学研究的热点问题。本文在诺思的暴力潜能理论及奥尔森的国家起源理论基础上，通过理论和模型的分析，可以得到统治者的偏好和有限理性对制度变迁起决定性影响的结论。多数情况下，统治者偏好和有限理性使得统治者在决定制度变迁、制度安排的时候，总是将统治者个人利益置于社会利益之上，以致造成制度的效率损耗或效率低下，而制度的效率又决定着封建王朝经济的发展水平及其周期性兴衰。

英文摘要：

The periodic rise and fall of a dynasty has become a hot issue in the field of new institutional economics and historical study in recent years. With the violent potential theory and Olsen North＇s origin of the state on the basis of the theory, through the analysis of theory and model, it can be concluded that the preference and limited rationality of a ruler play a decisive role in the institutional erence and limited rationality make rulers give priority to making decisions on institutional changes, which leads to tional efficiency determines economic development as well their personal interests change. The rulers＇ pref- over social welfare while low institutional efficiency. However, the institu- as the periodic rise and fall of a dynasty.