中文摘要：

本文通过构建经理管理防御指数,以2003-2007年制造业上市公司为研究样本,在Richardson投资期望模型的基础上,采用建立虚拟变量的研究方法,对上市公司过度投资行为与经理人管理防御行为的关系及其制约机制进行了研究。研究发现：（1）上市公司过度投资行为与经理管理防御有显著的正相关关系;（2）具有防御动机的经理人的过度投资行为对融资活动产生的现金流量更为敏感;（3）经理持股、派发现金股利有助于制约经理人的过度投资行为,负债对经理人的过度投资行为制约作用效果不明显。

英文摘要：

Basing on building managerial entrenchment index and Richardson investment model of expectations, the paper uses the data of listed manufacturing companies from 2003 to 2007 by setting up dummy variables to study the relationship between the managerial entrenchment and over-investment and control mechanism. The results show that：（1） there is a significant positive correlation between over-investment in a listed company and the managerial entrenchment; （2） the over-investment activities is more sensitive to the cash flows from financing activities; （3） manager ownership, distribution of cash dividends help to impede over-investment manager behavior, but the liabilities do not have an obvious effect on it.