欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
文章通过构建基于公司资本结构理论的对外担保定价模型以及市场对担保的需求反映模型推理发现,负债比率更高的公司其提供的担保价格更低,绩效更差的公司担保价格更低,揭示担保供给方的定价策略导致购买资产负债率更高的企业所提供的担保更有利可图。模型揭示了在我国资本市场中,提供对外担保公司的资产负债率更高,经营绩效更差这一现象是由担保方定价策略及被担保方收益程度所定,并非是单纯的大股东对小股东的掏空行为。
英文摘要：
The paper, by constructing a theoretical model on the mechanism of the price of loan guarantee from the aspects of both guarantors and debtors based on the theory of capital structure, finds that guarantors with higher leverage or worse perfor- mance provide loan guarantee with lower price, and therefore give more benefits to debtors without harming their own value. The model reveals the phenomenon that firms with higher leverage or worse performance are more likely to issue loan guaran- tees in China＇s capital market, which is determined by guarantors＇ pricing strategy and debtors＇ benefits but not tunneling.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
What precludes the development of noninterest activities in Chinese commercial banks from the perspe
期刊信息
位置：