中文摘要：

政府给予制造商用于废旧电器电子产品回收处理的财政补贴将鼓励制造商的回收再制造活动.将政府也作为一个决策主体,建立了以政府为领导者,制造商和回收商为跟随者的回收再制造过程的主从博弈.其中假定制造商对回收商回收努力采用最优激励契约方式.针对两种不同的产业组织结构建立和求解了这个动态博弈.通过对均衡结果的边际分析讨论了政府决策如何影响制造商和回收商之间的激励契约,以及政府、制造商和回收商的决策在不同产业组织结构的绩效.

英文摘要：

The government acted as a decision maker to subsidize the manufacturer for recovering and remanufacturing the wasted electrical and electronic goods.We established a Stackelberg game in which the government is the leader while the manufacturer and recyclers are the follower.There was principal-agent relationship between the manufacturer and the recyclers.We researched two industrial organization and analyzed their equilibriums respectively.As a result,we find how the government decision affects the contracts between the manufacturer and the recyclers,and how different industrial organization affects government decision.