由分工产生的交易成本及团队效应,是经济组织的两种诱发起源方式,前者本质是权力,并由股权权威人为制造“制序”,后者本质是制度,并由分散的股权意志加总,演化形成系统内部制序,两者均是实现组织制序快速同化、降低交易成本的决定因素,其经济组织的生产函数由该权力比例结构下形成的制度所决定。当组织中不同利益参与者的平均福利量会增加、但不是所有人的边际量会相等时,其诱致性制度变迁的选择性激励偏好,将产生外部性并出现市场失灵;而强制性制度变迁,则是一组权力序的相互博弈妥协的结果,所达成的制度内容是制序的“度”的选择,称为“制序度”,其效率具有先降后升再下降的特征,其利益参与者的不同行为选择,将由他们持有的不同稀缺资源在权力结构中的利益分配值即夏普利值所决定。
Trading costs and team-work effect, the result of social divi- sion of labor, are two factors that trigger economic organizations. For the former, the nature of which is power, an order made by the authoritative share-holder; for the latter,the nature of which is institution,an internal order evolving from the add up of the will of the scattering share-holders. Both of them are the deciding factors in effecting a quick assimilation of institutional order and decreasing trading costs. The productive function of these e- conomic organizations is determined by systems based on the power-ratio structure. When the average welfare of the members in the organization increases with margin differences, we should rethink the logic feasibility of an including system change. A compulsory change of system is a consequence of the mutual gaming and mutual compromising of the power clusters. Its outcome,a selection of the “degree of order” of the system, is referred as “degree of system order”, whose efficiency clearly bears characteristics of hysteretic nature. Under the compulsorily changed system, the behavior of the participants is decided by the rare resources they hold and the value of their interests shared,i, e. the Shapley value.