欢迎您！东篱公司
退出
-
申报数据库
-
立项数据库
-
成果数据库
-
项目获奖数据库
中文摘要：
不安全行为是导致一些行业安全事故频发的重要原因,而行为是受到代理人自身和所处制度环境双重作用而产生的。制度可以重建,但如果对个体层面不安全行为选择动机不理解,制度重建就无从谈起。本文以制度环境为背景,以代理人理性选择为前提,建立了进化博弈模型来描述不安全行为与安全行为之间是如何通过模仿来进行转换的。本文建立的模型解释了不安行为选择的制度和策略基础,展示了不安全行为选择的动态转换过程,找到了控制不安全行为选择的有效手段。
英文摘要：
Research findings have shown that some unsafe behavior is one of the most important reasons for the frequent occurrence of safety accidents in some industries,which is usually affected by individuals themselves as well as the institutional environment they work in.It is believed that the institutions can not be effectively rebuilt,unless the individuals＇ motivations under the unsafe behavior are understood.Therefore,this paper sets up an evolutionary game model to describe how to transform some unsafe behavior into safe behavior through imitation,which is based on the institutional environment and individuals＇ rational choice.This model explains the basic system and strategy of the unsafe behavior,demonstrates the dynamic transformation of the choosing unsafe behavior,and discovers the methods to control some unsafe behavior.
同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文
The safety-level gap between China and the US in view of the interaction between coal production and
Focusing on coal miners’ occupational disease issues: A comparative analysis between China and the U
Rent-seeking mechanism for safety supervision in the Chinese coal industry based on a tripartite gam
Research on coal mine safety supervision efficiency in China based on multi-agent modeling and simul
Factors Affecting Regional Per-Capita Carbon Emissions in China Based on an LMDI Factor Decompositio
How to achieve a low-carbon economy in china: From individual attitudes to actual consumption behavi
期刊信息
位置：