中文摘要：

基于委托代理框架考察了我国上市公司税收规避与管理者机会主义行为之间的关系。研究发现，税收规避程度越高，公司过度投资现象越严重，且避税活动所产生的节税收益提高了投资现金流敏感度；另外，公司避税加剧了管理者的在职消费行为。进一步研究表明，高水平的公司综合治理机制能够有效抑制隐藏在避税背后的管理者机会主义行为。

英文摘要：

This paper investigates the relations between corporate tax avoidance of Chinese listed companies and their managerial opportunism behavior based on principle agent perspective. We find that tax avoidance leads to higher level of overinvestment and tax benefits increase investment cash flow sensitivity. In addition, corporate tax avoidance aggravates managerial perquisites. Further studies show that better comprehensive corporate governance mechanism can restrain managerial opportunism behavior hidden behind tax avoidance activities.