中文摘要：

地缘关系是构成中国关系型社会的重要基石，本文把省级领导人在所管辖省份内曾经的重要任职经历地定义为拥有省级核心领导入主政关系的区域，并研究拥有这种主政关系的微观企业是否因核心政府官员情系故地而享受到地域偏爱。实证结果发现，省级核心官员对处于其重要任职经历所在地域的上市公司表现出明显的地域偏爱情结，表现为拥有主政关系的上市公司获得了更多的政府补助，且这一结果主要体现在有政治关联和最终控制人为国有的上市公司中；进一步研究发现，上述关系因官员主政关系的强度和地区腐败程度的不同而存在差异，且上市公司因主政关系而获取的政府补助并未显著提高经济效益，反而明显降低了社会效益；此外，还发现拥有省级领导人的老乡关系对公司获得政府补助没有显著影响。本文的结果表明地域偏爱是除了政治晋升激励之外核心政府官员干预微观经济的重要机理。结论为产业政策之争提供了进一步的证据，同时支持了全面深化体制改革中以制约主要领导干部权力为重点的政治体制改革，对官员任职的“地域回避”制度设计也提供了优化建议。

英文摘要：

Geo-social relation is very important in the establishment of connections in China, in this paper we define the cities where the province governor/party secretary once served in the key governmental positions are cities with high-level officials＇ prior-job relation ship （HOPR）, and test whether such cities could benefit from core officials＇ regional favorit- ism. We find that, firms in cities with HOPR get more subsidies, and this relationship are mainly significant in firms with political connections and in SOEs; further studies figure out that the intensity of regional favoritism varies with the intensity of HOPR and regional cor ruption; well, there is no evidence that HOPR helps firms improve performance through sub- sidies, however, HOPR damages the social welfare of governmental subsidies to some extent. What＇s more, we do not find significant empirical evidence that ＂Townee Relationship＇have effects on firms＇ acquiring of governmental subsidies. Our paper points out a mechanism dif- ferent from political promotion that high-level officials have strong incentive to involve in the micro-economy, and we find that this kind of intervention harms the efficiency of resources allocation. In addition, our paper is also a good response to the current political reforms ai- ming at ＂put the officials＇ power into the cage of legal system＂, and provides suggestions for the design of ＂regional evasion system＂.