基于交易成本理论,本文分析了治理环境如何影响企业寻租动机并进而影响企业交易成本——非生产性支出。本文借鉴并改进了Anderson et al.(2006)模型,探讨了非生产性支出的度量,并实证检验了影响非生产性支出的制度因素。研究表明,企业所处地区治理环境对交易成本有显著影响,减少政府干预、改善政府服务、加强法律保护均有利于减少企业非生产性支出。本文研究发现不仅具有理论上的意义,也为我国市场化改革提供了进一步的实证支持。
Based on the transaction cost theory, this paper analyzes how governance environment affects firms' rent-seeking incentive and their non-productive expenditures. We measure non-productive expenditures according to a revised model of Anderson (2006), and observe how institutional factors affect the expenditures. We find that governance environment significantly affects firms' transaction cost. If local governments could reduce their administrative interventions, improve their services, or strengthen law protections, the firms' non-productive expenditures would be lower. The findings offer some empirical supports to market-oriented economic reform.