中文摘要：

本文利用M—V偏好函数构造了满足农户和保险公司期望效用最大化条件的农业保险供需模型，考察了竞争性农业保险市场短期均衡的存在，论证了长期农业保险市场失衡是由于供给者考虑巨灾风险所致，而政府给予保费补贴有助于纠正农业保险市场失衡，但纠正的程度视补贴大小而定，以此为基础实证分析了我国农业保险市场的发展。理论和实证对我国农业保险保费补贴及其他保险风险转移工具的设计具有一定意义。

英文摘要：

Under the condition of farms＇ and insurance companies＇ expected utility maximum, we develop an agricultural insurance market equilibrium model based on the M - V preference function and point out that the equilibrium in short agricultural market exists. And then demonstrate that catastrophic risk makes insurance companies responsive lead to the disequilibrium of agricultural insurance market. Government＇ s subsidy to premium can help facilitate the disequilibrium ; but to what extent depend on the scale of subsidy, based on this analysis we verify the development of China＇ s agricultural insurance market. The theoretic and empirical analysis has important implications for the design and management of China＇ s agricultural insurance risk and government subsidy.