中文摘要：

在综合考虑缺货惩罚成本以及剩余产品残值的基础上，首先分析了简单批发价格契约的不合理性，即其在协调供应链时所确定的批发价格小于产品的生产成本，然后建立了基于Stackelberg模型的批发价格契约和基于Nash协商模型的批发价格契约。通过分析发现，基于Stackelberg模型的批发价格契约可以克服简单批发价格契约的不合理性，但不能协调供应链，而基于Nash协商模型的批发价格契约不仅克服了简单批发价格契约的不合理性，而且可以实现供应链的协调。最后，通过数值试验验证了相应的结论。

英文摘要：

Based on the comprehensive consideration of penalty cost of surplus-stock and the salvage of overstock, this paper analyzes firstly the irrationality of the simple wholesale price contract, i. e. the wholesale price determined by the simple wholesale price contract is less than the product cost; and then establishes the wholesale price contract based on the Stackelberg model and the Nash negotiation model. The results, through the survey and analysis, show that the wholesale price contract based on the Stackelberg model can＇ t coordinate the supply chain, despite it can overcome the irrationality of the simple wholesale price contract, while the wholesale price contract based on the Nash negotiation model can not only overcome the irrationality of the simple wholesale price contract, but also coordinate the supply chain. Finally, the numerical experiment followed verifies the conclusions of the paper.