"资产替代"是股东债权人冲突的主要表现形式之一,在实证分析中通常用过度投资来表示。稳健的会计政策能从事前和事后两方面减少股东和管理层的过度投资倾向,从而减少了债务契约中的资产替代行为,保护债权人的权益。本文的实证研究表明,截面的会计稳健性具有真实的投资效应,抑制了非理性的过度投资倾向。经过分样本的实证检验发现,会计稳健性抑制过度投资的作用只存在于非政府控制的样本中,地方政府控制削弱了会计稳健性保护债权人利益的作用。
"Asset Substitution",denoted by over-investment in general,is one of the main forms of conflicts between shareholders and creditors.Accounting conservatism reduces shareholders and management's over-investment and assets substitution behavior to protect creditors.The results show that,there is some real effect of accounting conservatism on investment.But the real effect of conservatism on investment only exists in non-government controlled firms,that is to say,local government weakens the effect of accounting conservatism on protecting creditors.