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中文摘要：
本文针对制造商、分销商和零售商组成的三层供应链系统，研究了价格敏感型需求下的联盟博弈和收益分配问题．理论分析表明独立决策下的的供应链系统利润最低，小联盟决策能提高系统利润，但是未入小联盟的成员收益涨幅则更为明显，智猪博弈的结果会致使小联盟解散，而运用Shapley值法协调后的大联盟相对更为稳定，其成员利润均比非合作决策时有大幅度的提高，有利于激励供应链成员保持长期充分的合作．最后，通过数值算例对上述结论作了进一步释义和分析．
英文摘要：
For the three-echelon supply chain system composed of manufacturers, distributors and retailers, this paper discusses the cooperative game and the profit allocation under the price-sensitive demand. It is shown that： the supply chain system by the independent decision-making has the least profit, and the system by the minor league decision-making can improve the system profit, but the profit of the members outside the minor league rises even more obviously, and the result of Pigs＇ payoffs would cause the dissolution of the minor league, while the major league coordinated by using the Shapley value method is relatively more stable, and its members＇ profit often increases and it is helpful to encourage the members to keep a long-term cooperation. Finally, the conclusions are further illustrated through numerical examples.
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