笔者从理论与实证角度分析资本市场的经营预期与公司实际绩效差距对公司研发行为的影响,得到研究结论:公司实际绩效低于资本市场的经营预期时,经理人倾向于减少研发投入,而实际绩效高于资本市场的经营预期时,经理人为了能继续实现资本市场的经营预期,仍将减少研发投入;机构持股比例和分析师关注度在绩效压力与研发行为的关系中起到了调节作用,相对于机构持股比例或分析师关注度较低的公司,机构持股比例或分析师关注度较高的公司的期望绩效差距对研发行为的负向影响将减弱,有利于解决经理人与股东间的代理问题。
In this paper,the author theoretically and empirically examines the effect of pressure which generated from the performance relative to analyst forecasts on RD intensity. The author proposes that managers tend to cut RD expenses when they are under pressure to meet analyst forecasts. We further argue that institutional investors' shareholding and analyst coverage can serve as an external monitoring mechanism to help contain this agency problem. Institutional investors' shareholding and analyst coverage weakens the negative relationship between performance gap and firm RD intensity.