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中文摘要：
城市道路交通设施作为准公用物品,其外部效应必然导致交通拥堵的发生,实施拥堵收费的目的则是使交通拥堵产生的外部成本内部化,确保城市道路资源得到高效配置,应用经济杠杆来调节交通需求,以缓解交通拥堵。本文应用合作博弈相关理论对城市道路拥堵网络问题进行了分析,从同一时刻各个路段的通勤者数目这一角度定义拥堵成本,重点证明了拥堵成本为凸函数的城市道路拥堵网络博弈存在非空的核,拥堵成本为凹函数的城市道路交通网络博弈虽不存在非空的核,但总是存在最优的树网络,最后,结合上述结论对城市道路拥堵收费进行讨论,从理论上对拥堵收费的合理性进行了说明,并提出了进一步研究的方向。
英文摘要：
As quasi-public goods, the externalities of urban road transportation facilities will lead to traffic congestion inevitably. The purpose of implementation of congestion pricing in some big cities is to internalize the exterior cost caused by traffic congestion, and to get efficient allocation of urban road resources, which applies eco-nomic leverage to regulate traffic demand, so as to ease traffic congestion. Urban road traffic congestion is ana- lyzed based on cooperative game in this paper. From the perspective of the number of travelers on each section at the same time, the congestion cost is defined. Evidences show traffic network problems with convex congestion costs, the corresponding game with a non-empty core. If congestion costs are concave, then the corresponding game has not necessarily core elements, but there always exist optimal tree networks. Finally, the feasibility of congestion pricing is analyzed, some issues arising from this work and further research directions are discussed in the last section.
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