位置:成果数据库 > 期刊 > 期刊详情页
政府补贴背景下制造商和零售商博弈研究
  • 期刊名称:软科学
  • 时间:0
  • 页码:48-53
  • 语言:中文
  • 分类:F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]
  • 作者机构:[1]江西财经大学信息管理学院,南昌330013
  • 相关基金:基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(70861002);江西省教育厅科技项目(GJJ09290)
  • 相关项目:基于随机时变需求的供应链库存动态控制研究
作者: 柳键|邱国斌|
中文摘要:

基于非合作博弈模型与合作博弈模型研究制造商和零售商之间的关系以及政府补贴对企业带来的影响。结果表明,产品价格随着政府补贴的增加而增加,且非合作博弈情形下产品价格比合作博弈情形下产品价格增加更快;企业销售额随着政府补贴的增加而增加,而且,合作情形下销售额的增速更大,所以,补贴政策有助于刺激需求;企业利润随政府补贴的增加而增加,且合作情形下利润增长更快,补贴政策对企业也是有利的;合作情形下的企业利润高于非合作情形下的企业利润,且政府补贴越大,合作比不合作多带来的利润越大,企业更加愿意合作。

英文摘要:

Relationship between manufacturer and retailer and the impact of government' s subsidy on enterprises are studied based on cooperative and non-cooperative game models. The results show that: product price increases with the government's subsidies, and product price in non-cooperative game situation increases faster than that in cooperative game situation ; enterprise' s sale increases with the government' s subsidy, and the sale in cooperative game situation in- creases faster; thus subsidy policy helps to stimulate demand; enterprise' s profit increases with the government' s subsi- dies, and profit in cooperative game situation increases faster than in non-cooperative game situation; subsidy policy is also favorable to enterprises; profit in cooperative game situation is higher than in non-cooperative game situation; coop- eration can bring more profit than non-cooperation with larger government' s subsidy; companies are willing to cooperate.

同期刊论文项目
同项目期刊论文