中文摘要：

惯例是一个协调博弈中多重均衡的一种精炼，是经过长期演化形成的一种稳定均衡。在博弈论框架下，对惯例的定义和内涵进行了梳理和阐释，从多重均衡的选择原则出发，对惯例的演化和变迁机制进行了探讨，认为决定惯例演化和变迁起源的原始动力可能就是社会成员最初具有的某种凸显性信念，这种信念是由人类的生物性本能和社会性共同决定的。在此基础上，通过对博弈参与者行为的合理假设，基于拟线性效用函数构建了一个社会惯例演化模型，刻画了多重均衡的选择与惯例演化之间的关系，对惯例的演化和变迁提供一个合乎逻辑的解释。

英文摘要：

Convention is an Evolutionarily Stable Equilibrium in a coordination game with multiple equilibriums, and its forming process is by means of long-term evolution. First, an interpretation and clarification of the definition and connotation of convention is provided within the framework of Game Theory. Then some viewpoints about multiple equilibriums selection principles are summarized, followed by a discussion of the evolution mechanism of convention and change. A conclusion is that it is probably a kind of prominent belief, which is rooted in the members＇ initial mind in a society and commonly determined by human＇s biological instinct and sociality. Several hypotheses are put forward, and an evolutionary game model of social convention based on quasi-linear utility function is developed, which describes the relationship between multiple equilibriums selection and evolution of convention. The purpose is to present a logical explanation for evolution and change of convention.