本文从政府权力视角,设立分权制度下中央、地方两级政府的目标函数,分别在大政府范畴的预算约束条件下求解其最优选择和长期稳态路径。本文的结论是,长期稳态价格水平不仅取决于中央、地方两级政府的债务规模、税收与支出,而且还受到国有企业投资的影响;中央政府的投资、债务、利润与货币增长之间相互推进,地方政府为扩大投资竞争融资来源具有强烈的货币增长需求,这倒逼货币供给增加;通货膨胀主要原因之一就是政府权力软约束下的营利性投资扩张。因此,治理通货膨胀的必要条件是,设计一种政府与治理通货膨胀具有共融利益的制度,减少政府营利性的准公共投资,增加事关国计民生的纯公共支出。
From the perspective of government power, this paper established the objective function of central and local levels of government in the decentralized system, and drew the preliminary conclusions: long-term steady-state price level depended not only on the central and local levels of government debts, taxes and expenditure, but also on the effect of state-owned enterprises investment scale; central govern- ment investment, debt, profit and money growth had the relation to pushing each other; and local govern- ments to expand investment with a strong competitive sources of financing monetary growth required to find ways to compete for bank loans, force the increase of monetary supply. Inflation was one major result of profit investment expansion of soft constrained government power. Therefore a necessary condition for controlling inflation was to design an institution that government could get some interests through control- ling inflation, had incentive to reduce the scale of the government's profitable quasi-public investment, and to increase the pure public investment related to the national economy and the people's livelihood.