中文摘要：

如何有效缓解借贷双方的信息不对称对降低公司债务融资成本至关重要。在构建公司董事联结网络的基础上,从社会关系网络信息传递功能角度出发,分析董事网络影响债务融资成本的作用机理,进一步探讨在面临融资约束、代理成本以及两者交互作用下董事网络对债务融资成本影响的差异,采用社会网络分析、多元回归分析和二元Logistic回归分析等方法,以2006年至2010年中国沪深A股上市公司为研究对象进行实证分析。研究结果表明,总体上看,中国上市公司董事网络位置对债务融资成本的降低作用不显著;相比于非融资约束公司,存在融资约束时处于董事网络中心位置的公司债务融资成本降幅显著更大,说明信息不对称程度越高的公司更能从董事网络中获益;在融资约束和代理成本的相互制衡下,越处于董事网络中心位置的公司,其债务融资成本越低。董事网络的信息传递功能和治理效应在信息不对称公司的融资能力中扮演重要角色。

英文摘要：

How to effectively alleviate asymmetric information is essential to reduce corporate debt financing costs. The study builds corporate board network and investigates the mechanism of how board network affects the debt financing costs from the per- spective of social network information transmission, and then further explores differences of the impact of board network on debt financing costs in the condition of financing constraints, agency costs as well as the interaction between them. The study employ- ees social network analysis, multiple regression analysis and binary logistic regression analysis methods and takes data from Chi- na＇s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2010 for empirical analysis. The results indicate that the po- sition in the board network of China＇s listed companies does not significantly reduce debt financing costs. Companies in the core position of the board network with financing constraints reduce more debt financing costs, compared to companies with non-finan- cing constraints, which shows companies with higher degree of information asymmetry benefit more from the board network. The central location of companies, constrained by the interaction between financing constraints and agency costs, lower more debt fi- nancing costs. The information transmission function and governance effect of board network play an important role in companies＇ financing capacity for the companies with information asymmetry.