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高危企业社会保险投资与员工忠诚度的博弈分析
  • 期刊名称:中国安全科学学报,2009年,第19卷,第3期,45-48页
  • 时间:0
  • 分类:X915.4[环境科学与工程—安全科学]
  • 作者机构:[1]西安科技大学能源学院,西安710054, [2]中国人寿股份有限公司西安分公司,西安710001, [3]西安科技大学管理学院,西安710054
  • 相关基金:国家自然科学基金资助(70673079).
  • 相关项目:煤矿安全投资溢出规律与基于实物期权的安全投资决策量化模型研究
中文摘要:

运用经济博弈论方法,研究高危企业社会保险投资与员工忠诚度问题,建立博弈模型,得出混合策略纳什均衡解,并对影响企业社会保险投资概率和员工忠诚度大小的因素进行分析,得出以下结论:企业对于员工社会保险投资力度越大,或对于不忠诚员工的惩罚力度越大,或对于忠诚员工的奖励越高,越有助于员工忠诚企业。同时指出:企业对员工采取“一刀切”的做法,会挫伤忠诚员工爱企强企的积极性;启发企业实行公平分配机制,来提高员工忠诚度和企业效益,要从积极的态度出发,以人为本,加大保险投资力度,为员工提供安全和生活保障;只有使双方的“非合作博弈”逐步过渡到“合作博弈”,才能调动和爱护员工的爱岗敬业积极性。

英文摘要:

By using economic game theory, a game model reflecting the relation between social insurance investment and employee's loyalty was established, and the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium solution was obtained. Meanwhile, the factors influencing the probability of social insurance investment and employee's loyalty were also analyzed. It is concluded that the bigger the investment on employee's social insurance is,or the more severe the punishment to un-loyal employees is, or the higher the reward to loyal employees is, the more helpful it is to the loyalty of employees. The way of treating employees with no flexibility will damage employee's positivity, enforcing a fair distribution system and "people-oriented" life guarantee system will improve employee's loyalty. In a word, only making the "non-cooperative game" between employes and enterprises gradually transter to " cooperative game, can the employee's positivity and loyalty be mobilized.

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