中文摘要：

为刻画软件平台商的软件知识产权保护行为对软件平台商双边价格策略的影响,本文在综合考虑消费者和应用软件开发者不同平台接入行为以及软件平台商寡头竞争市场结构的基础上,构建了软件平台商寡头竞争的Hotelling模型,比较分析了在消费者与应用软件开发者不同平台接入行为下,软件平台商的软件保护行为对其双边用户的定价策略的影响关系。研究结果发现,在双边用户单平台接入下,消费者接入费和应用软件开发者授权费都取决于自身的交叉网络效应强度;而软件平台商软件保护力度越大,消费者接入费将越低,应用软件开发者授权费将越高。在消费者单平台接入、应用软件开发者多平台接入条件下,消费者的接入费与双边用户的交叉网络效应强度都呈负相关关系,而应用软件开发者的授权费与消费者的交叉网络效应强度呈正相关关系,而与自身的交叉网络效应强度呈负相关关系;软件平台商软件保护力度越大,应用软件开发者授权费也将越高,而对消费者接入费的影响取决于两边用户所产生的交叉网络边际效应的对比。这些结论对软件平台商的软件保护、平台定价等行为有着重要的指导借鉴意义。

英文摘要：

To characterize the impact of the software protection for the two-sided user pricing strategies of the software platform,a Hotelling model of the oligopoly competition of software platform is built considering the consumers and software developers＇ different access to software platform and the oligopoly market structure of software platform,which compares and analyses the relationship between the software protection and two-sided user price strategies of the e software platform.The results show under the twosided end-user＇singlehoming,the users＇ access fee and the software developers＇ license fee depend on the strength of their cross-group network effects and the users＇ access fee decrease with better software protection,but the license fee increase with better software protection.However,under the users＇ singlehoming and the software developers＇ multihoming,there are inverse correlation between the users＇ access fee and the strength of two-sided end-user＇cross-group network effects,but the license fee is proportional to the strength of user＇cross-group network effects and is inversely proportional to the strength of software developers＇ cross-group network effects.The impact of software protection on the users＇ access fee,depends on the comparison of marginal effect of the users＇ and software developers＇ cross-group network effects.These conclusions have important referential significant to the software protection and pricing strategies.