中文摘要：

基于Rubinstein轮流出价的讨价还价博弈理论构建创新提供者与潜在采纳企业间的讨价还价模型。研究表明,在从创新提供者直接向潜在采纳者扩散的讨价还价过程中,创新提供者的出价与己方的心理压力呈减函数关系,与潜在采纳企业的心理压力呈增函数关系,双方的收益与己方的心理压力呈反向关系,与对方的心理压力状态呈正向关系;当中介机构代表创新提供者时,低碳技术创新贬值越大、潜在采纳企业心理压力的越小,创新提供者越急于寻求中介机构的帮助,当中介机构代表潜在采纳企业时,潜在采纳企业选择采纳低碳技术创新和选择不采纳策略间的收益差值越大、创新提供者的心理压力越大,潜在采纳企业越愿意寻求中介机构的帮助。

英文摘要：

The paper builds and analyzes the processes of direct and indirect bargaining between innovation providers and potential adopted enterprises based on Rubinstein bargaining game theory. The results show that the transaction price of low carbon technology innovation will promote its perfect diffusion only when it is controlled in a certain range. The price form innovation provider has diminishing function relationship with their psychological pressure, and has increasing function relationship with potential adopted enterprises＇ psychological pressure. Earnings of both sides are inverse with their own psychological pressure, and synthetic with psychological pressure of the other side. When mediation organization represents innovation provider, the greater depreciation of innovation is, the smaller stress of potential adopter is, then more eager to ask for the help of mediation organization. When mediation organization represents potential adopter, the larger income difference of potential adopters between adopting innovation and not adopting innovation is, the larger stress of innovation provider is, then more eager to ask for the help of mediation organization.